"The Political Movement that Dared not Speak its own Name:
The Neoliberal Thought Collective Under Erasure" Philip Mirowski Sept 2014 I have experienced a range of odd reactions to my work as an historian, but none so disconcerting as the ones which have greeted some joint work I did with some European historians and then in a separate single-authored book, both dedicated to the history of Neoliberalism as a thought collective and political movement combined. 1 Those reactions have taken, roughly, two formats: the first, that "Neoliberalism" is nothing more than the fevered delusions of my addled brain, a mirage perhaps shared with a few other addled persons, and thus best ignored; and the second, that if such a thing does indeed exist, it is far too uneven and inconsistent to count as a serious analytical category; and thus, attempts to provide an intellectual history and conceptual critique of the movement are in vain, and consequently, the Left should keep away from any such history of ideas. A few go so far as to admit that Michel Foucault made a similar mistake in his late lectures on the Birth of Biopolitics, so perhaps a lesser soul such as I can be forgiven for my intemperate forays-after all, the postmodern poststructuralists provide the slippery slope to Bedlam, at least according to much Anglo philosophical thought.
I collect a few examples of these pronouncements from historians, people whom one might think would know better…
Template models of Neoliberalism have been rightly questioned by structural and nonstructural analysts alike… The indiscriminate cry that 'Neoliberalism did it' belongs in the same family as the 'I blame Thatcher' denunciations of old; who did what, to whom, where, and how must be specified in social, economic and institutional terms. (Peck, 2013, pp. 15, 19) . Part of the difficulty comes from [an] attempt to both distinguish and write about neoliberal thought and neoliberal politics in one account. And part of it comes from the very nomenclature of Neoliberalism itself, an overtheorized term that lacks a historically specific constituency and has been applied haphazardly to nearly every feature of the globalized modern world. (Burns, 2014, 260) [Angus Burgin's] Great Persuasion provides the most lucid account available of so-called 'neoliberal' ideas that are associated with the Mont Pèlerin Society…. Nonetheless, 'neoliberalism' has always been a slippery concept. As the term came in and out of use over the course of an oft-interrupted history, its meaning has varied, sometimes flipped on its head, and traded places with any number of alternative labels. (Brick, 2014, 875) In…December 2012, the Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory at the University of Manchester debated the motion, 'The concept of Neoliberalism has become an obstacle to the anthropological understanding of the twenty-first century.' (Ganti, 2014, 2) . There is no report of the final verdict of the evening. ** And even stranger, there are writers (mostly economists, to be fair) who further insist that the history of the endeavors and institutions surrounding the Mont Pèlerin Society do not really matter:
To understand how a body of thought became an era of capitalism requires more than just intellectual history. (Heideman, 2014) The biggest problem with Mirowski's position is that for the 'double truth' argument to hold requires the operation of an extraordinary conspiracy. It requires the sustained disciplined approach by intellectuals to deliberately engage in propaganda in public, while flatly contradicting such public pronouncements in private. (Cahill, 2014, p.41) Hayek's ambition-to rebuild a modernized Neoliberalism on ethical foundations other than simple individualism-would go nowhere in the MPS… Outside the economics profession, it was invisible. The MPS was no more influential inside the economics profession… Burgin thinks that the MPS had served the purpose of providing a sort of institutional home for the cultivation of neoliberal ideology. I am skeptical… (Solow, 2012 ) ****
The complaints of the historians and anthropologists, that Neoliberalism doesn't really exist, seem to me to display a curious naïveté about the interaction of ideas and political movements in general. In contrast, the opinions of the economists quoted above border on the delusional, suggesting there really is something structural about the aversion to confront one of the most important political phenomena in the contemporary intellectual landscape.
I can sympathize with an impatience for those who use the term Neoliberalism as a blanket swear-word for everything they despise, or a brainless synonym for modern capitalism (or whatever the buzzword du jour); but the quotes excerpted above are taken from historians who have at some point in their own endeavors written articles or books on the topic. At least one might hope that they would avoid conflation of the existence of some putative social entity, like a capitalist economy, with political ideas about that entity, like, say, the Austrian theory of markets as discovery prostheses-except some do seem to backslide. Perhaps worse, some of the most celebrated recent intellectual histories on the topic, like Angus Burgin's Great Persuasion, or Daniel Stedman Jones' Masters of the Universe, tend to either abjure the label altogether, or make a botch of distinguishing neoliberals from libertarians or plain vanilla conservatives. Thus, even though there have been an abundance of books and papers with the word 'neoliberalism' in the title {see the graphs below}, perhaps the quality of thought about the subject has not exactly been flourishing. 
Sticks and Stones
It is dumbfounding to observe how everyone suddenly reverts to being a strict nominalist when they encounter Neoliberalism. They circle round the word as if it were a dead animal in the middle of the road, crushed and distended, trying to figure out what to call it, even though, strictly speaking, they reserve judgment over whether it is really there. They complain: it is a rascal concept, a spitting pejorative, a bloated concept of dubious utility, polysemic yet empty at the core, a sloppy synonym for capitalism, a hymn to "free markets" (as though those words were any less slippery).
Self-identified neoliberals are hard to come by; there is no political party or national regime that touts the 'neoliberal' moniker; it does not denote a professional position in economics or anywhere else. And yet many take the view that neoliberalism's continued reign is among the most perplexing puzzles of our time.
2 And yet, and yet… kicking and screaming, many of those souls then proceed to use it.
But even more vexing are those professional historians such as Jennifer Burns and Angus
Burgin, whose whole careers have been devoted to researching the neoliberals, but whom have expressly renounced any use of the term; they then immediately stumble into a briar patch of notquite-correct synonyms like 'liberals' or 'libertarians' or (God forbid) 'conservatives'.
This queasiness around labels (as in so much else in the later authors) merely channels Friedrich Hayek's own brief skirmish with nominalism right after WWII:
[C]urrent political terms are ambiguous, or even that the same term often means nearly the opposite to different groups. There is the much more serious fact that the same word frequently appears to unite people who in fact believe in contradictory and irreconcilable ideals. Terms like 'liberalism' or 'democracy', 'capitalism' or 'socialism', no longer stand for coherent systems of ideas. They have come to describe aggregations of quite heterogeneous principles and facts which historical accident has associated with these words… (1948, pp.2-3) Words that stand in for political doctrines have been notoriously polysemous and unreliable as freestanding categories, as anyone who has ever travelled outside the Anglo sphere rapidly learns when they bandy about the commonplace term "liberal" in conversation. It is disconcerting to discover that a label that designates the soft Left in North America designates its opposite in France or Latin America. By that evidence, "liberalism" doesn't really exist either.
But, viewed dispassionately, this is true of most politically charged terms, especially those that touch on economics. And it is a mistake to believe that the only legitimate labels are those which are freely embraced by the very people who espouse the doctrines in question. Interestingly, the Chicago drive to reconciliation was also resisted within the Neoliberal Thought
Collective as well, with Hayek, the Austrian School, and the Ordoliberals all rejecting the legitimacy of neoclassical economic theory as an appropriate framework within which to understand how the market worked. So the situation resembles the Venn diagram in Figure 3 , at 3 I am always shocked to find the infrastructure of the Neoliberal Thought Collective is always far more developed than any of my private paranoid fantasies. Not only is Free to Choose available on the ubiquitous YouTube, but there is also a slick dedicated website called FreetoChoose.tv, with extended unedited tape from the series: http://www.freetochoose.tv/ideachannel.php?series=mfs . It also includes video lectures from many other neoliberal figures. The story of Friedman's TV series as a reaction to Galbraith's Age of Uncertainty is related in (Burgin, 2013) . 4 See (Van Horn & Mirowski, 2009). least from the 1950s-1990s. Yet, because Milton Friedman had become the mouthpiece for the neoliberal program in this era in the public sphere, understandably, thenceforth laypersons tended to infer that orthodox neoclassical economics and something like neoliberal politics were really the same thing.
The second distortion which can be laid at Friedman's door is that he was a master simplifier, even if it meant misrepresenting what fellow neoliberals had actually written, and the policies they had actually promoted. Nowhere was this more evident when he boiled down neoliberal politics to the desiccated slogan "Market good, government bad". He praised "deregulation" and "privatization"; but in practice, the truth was hidden in the details, which always involved government power. In other words, he falsely conflated neoliberalism with libertarianism, even though he was always careful to register some minor qualifications when pressed to clarify his position.
Figure 3: Neoclassical Economics and Neoliberal Doctrine
While it is undeniable that neoliberals routinely disparage the state, both back then and now, it does not follow that they are politically libertarian, or as Harvey would have it, are implacably opposed to state interventions in economy and society. Harvey's error is distressing, since even Antonio Gramsci understood this: "it must be made clear that laissez faire too is a form of state 'regulation' introduced and maintained by coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous automatic expression of economic facts." Mill's "harm principle": colloquially, the freedom of my fist stops at the freedom of your face.
The Neoliberals were having none of that, and explicitly said so.
Far from trying to preserve society against the unintended consequences of the operations of markets, as democratic liberalism sought to do, neoliberal doctrine instead set out actively to dismantle those aspects of society which might resist the purported inexorable logic of the catallaxy , and to reshape it in the market's image. For neoliberals, freedom and the market would be treated as identical. Their rallying cry was to remove the foundation of liberty from natural rights or tradition, and reposition it upon an entirely novel theory concerning what a market was, or should be. They could not acknowledge individual natural rights, because they sought to tutor the masses to become the agent the market would be most likely to deem to succeed. The market no longer gave you what you wanted; you had to capitulate to what the Market wanted. All areas of life could be better configured to behave as if they were more market-like. Gary Becker, an MPS member, for example, proposed a market-based approach to allow for socially optimal level of crime, and advocates a revolutionary extension of marginal calculus to include the "shadow costs" and benefits associated with all of "children, prestige or esteem, health, altruism, envy, and pleasure of the senses". Becker even proposes an economic model of the "dating market": one consequence of which is the proposition that polygamy for successful, wealthy men can be politically rationalized. And voila! Here is an article in the Sunday New York Times doing just that, as if it were real news. 9 Classical liberals like Mill or Michael Oakeshott would be spinning in their graves.
So no wonder outsiders are dazed and confused! The neoliberal revolutionaries contemptuous of tradition sought to conjure a fake tradition to mask their true intentions. They did this while explicitly abjuring the label of "conservative". I will come to why these supposed liberals need to mask their illiberal intentions shortly. But I will finish this section with one more reason that historians tend to think that to posit an effective intellectual formation called 'Neoliberalism' is a mistake.
Look around at intellectual history today and one will find one of two options: either close-grained biographies of the thought processes of some revered individual thinker, or else grand cosmic syntheses of intellectual trends, where contingency and chance reign, and the pinball of genealogy careens off a sequence of unrelated boundary bumpers, with the resulting history looking like one damn thing after another. Although once and a while someone bravely attempts to craft a prosopography, that is, something that is more than a motley collection of biographical sketches, their efforts are mostly given short shrift. The notion that ideas, and particularly political ideas, are the product of the concerted efforts of some thought collective stretching over generations, engaging in critique and reconstruction, fine-tuning and elaborating doctrine, and that their social interactions serve to ride herd on excessive originality and fruitless detours, while keeping focused upon problems of implementation and feasibility, is something that modern historians dismiss derisively as conspiracy theorizing. This is where we have arrived after all these generations: understanding human knowledge as the product of willful communal activity is derided as the province of the hoodwinked, the unsound, and the delusional.
9 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/opinion/sunday/who-runs-the-girls.html?_r=0
These days, intellectual history is rarely cast as the product of conscious deliberation of a dedicated cadre who may personally differ on many specific doctrinal points. There is perhaps no better evidence of neoliberal preconceptions having seeped into the thought processes of those moderns who would otherwise never be caught dead being designated as believers in
Neoliberalism. The days of the lone genius forging elaborate thought structures in his own head while sitting alone in some isolated garret are long gone, if they ever really existed in the first place. Innovation in the sciences and humanities is highly stylized and routinized, if not preordained. Thought processes and their expression in the modern world are effectively distributed and highly organized; real originality is extremely rare; political thought, in particular, displays heavily repetitive elements. This is one reason why I insist on using a category derived from the history of science, namely, the "thought collective". it has undergone much revision since then, and is still a hydra-headed Gorgon to this very day.
Neoliberal Detection Devices
Many people, once they hear the description I have just given of the Neoliberal Thought
Collective, immediately worry that the doctrines ascribed may be so diverse, and perhaps even contradictory, such that there is no good way to decide whether some idea is not Neoliberal. Or perhaps, putting it another way, how could you detect whether someone is a Neoliberal in good standing? It would be useless if this category expanded beyond all discrimination-then it would be nothing but a swearword. And we can't depend on the neoliberals to self-identify; they refuse to do that. foundations. These institutions were often set up as philanthropic or charitable units, if only to protect their tax status and seeming lack of bias. 11 Some of these foundations were much more than golden showers for the faithful, performing crucial organizational services as well: for instance, the Volker Fund kept a comprehensive "Directory" of affiliated neoliberal intellectuals, 10 Hartwell, Hayek advised him not to go into politics, but instead to start a public policy think tank. This, he was able to do -with the support of his profitable firm, Buxted Chickens, the first of the British battery hen companies. The wellsprings of neoliberal liberty in Britain, friends of the IEA might be forced to admit, had a little too much for comfort to do with the imprisonment of hens. (Cockett, 1994; Shearmur, 2014 Americans seemed oblivious to the spreading tentacles of the collective, politically active intellectuals in other countries were far more quick to pick up on the fact that something new and significant was happening. It was therefore authors on the periphery, primarily in Latin America and Francophone countries, who took to using the terminology of "Neoliberalism" in languages other than English, earlier and with greater frequency, as illustrated for books in Figure 6 .
Because the outer shells of the Neoliberal thought Collective were perceived as alien invaders outside the nominal core countries of the MPS, it is still the case that the language and analysis of Neoliberalism turn up far more frequently in the periphery than happens to be the case in the US, for example. This is documented by using Google Trends in Figure 7 . There is of course, no good history of the build-out of the intellectual and political capacity of the Neoliberal Thought Collective by the neoliberals themselves, although there are revealing accounts here and there of specific intellectuals, or more often, celebrations of particular think tanks. 14 The individualist bias also infects these memoirs of the NTC, since to pull back and expose the density of interconnections would smack of, well, conspiracy. But there is another pertinent reason why denizens of think tanks will never write a history of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. It is well known by those tanksters and historians of the Right in America, that the political rise of the New Right involved ignoring or suppressing the sharp differences of various political factions that would normally have had nothing to do with one another: the cultural conservatives, the Russell Kirk paleo-conservatives, the warlike neo-cons, the evangelical right, the libertarians, the white supremacists, and a whole host of others. 15 Since much of this "fusionism" was promoted at the key think tanks starting in the 1970s, the tanksters themselves had to repress being very precise over how certain strains of their political movement, and in particular, the neoliberals, had championed doctrines that clashed with the other factions. Worse, the tonier neoliberals, used to hobnobbing with the rich, tended to find their fellow travelers shambolic and a bit shabby, and thus insalubrious companions. Hence, the very tactical success of the New Right itself militated against insiders writing detailed outlines of My audience may glean the impression from this that the NTC is all about membership in the right clubs: rather like the British class system writ large. That would be unfortunate, because years of honing their message have reduced much of neoliberal doctrine to a discrete set of recognizable claims. The NTC is held together first and foremost by fealty to some core ideas; the institutional structure is primarily a means for those ideas to be inserted into various specific political situations, and to be passed on to the next generation. For purposes of discussion I paraphrase them here in extremely truncated format, without going into detail about any single proposition. The intellectual content of neoliberalism is something that warrants sustained discussion, but this can only happen once critical historians can admit they are no longer basing their evaluations on the isolated writings of a single author. There is no convenient crib sheet describing what the modern neoliberal thought collective actually believes.
(1) "Free" markets do not occur naturally. They must be actively constructed through political organizing. (2) "The market" is an information processor, and the most efficient one possible-more efficient than any government or any single human ever could be. (3) Market society is, and therefore should be, the natural and inexorable state of humankind. (4) The political goal of neoliberals is not to destroy the state, but to take control of it, and to redefine its structure and function, in order to create and maintain the market-friendly culture. (5) There is no contradiction between public/politics/citizenship and private/ market/entrepreneur-andconsumerism-because the latter does and should eclipse the former. (6) The most important virtue-more important than justice, or anything else-is freedom, defined "negatively" as "freedom to choose", and most importantly, defined as the freedom of corporations to act as they please. (7) Capital has a natural right to flow freely across national boundaries-labor, not so much. (8) Inequality-of resources, income, wealth, and even political rights-is a good thing; it prompts productivity, because people envy the rich and emulate them; people who complain about inequality are either sore losers or old fogies, who need to get hip to the way things work nowadays. (9) Corporations can do no wrong-by definition. (10) The market, engineered and promoted by neoliberal experts, can always provide solutions to problems seemingly caused by the market in the first place: there's always "an app for that." (11) There is no difference between is and should be: "free" markets both should be (normatively) and are (positively) most the efficient economic system, and the most just way of doing politics, and the most empirically true description of human behavior, and the most ethical and moral way to live-which in turn explains, and justifies, why their versions of "free" markets should be, and as neoliberals build more and more power, increasingly are, universal.
One of the best short definitions of neoliberalism I have encountered is the one by Will Davies, namely, the dependence upon the strong state to pursue the disenchantment of politics by economics. If that sounds like an oxymoron, well, maybe that's the nub of the project. As Margaret Thatcher is reported to have said, "Economics is the method, but the object is to change the soul."
Leo Strauss and the Necessary Lie
The Heritage Foundation has the following motto inscribed over its doors: "The Heritage Foundation is committed to building an America where freedom, opportunity, prosperity and civil society flourish." But arguably, at least its political wing Heritage Action is dedicated to none of those things. Hayek was quite clear that by "freedom" he should not be understood as advocating some vernacular notion of personal freedom; neither does Heritage Action. If the market is defined to be non-coercive, than any market activity is tautologically free. The Heritage crowd certainly are not enamored with democracy, either. "If democracy is taken to mean government by the unrestricted will of the majority", Hayek tells us, "I am not a democrat, and even regard such government as pernicious and in the long run unworkable". 18 Heritage Action has been directly responsible for the notorious do-nothing Congresses or recent vintage.
If opportunity refers to opportunities for workers, then they don't lose any sleep over it. Heritage has been an avid supporter of the freedom of corporations to offshore outsource American jobs;
and they oppose government assistance to the unemployed. Prosperity is a tossup; they like the fact that profits have ballooned since the crisis, but don't care that it has not resulted in serious jobs recovery or income restoration for the rest of the population. Indeed, they have long advocated abolition of the minimum wage. They hate the Thomas Piketty line that income and 18 Quoted in (Gamble 1996, p.92) wealth inequalities have become deleterious for the rest of the economy. And as for civil society-suffice it to say that outside market-like interactions, no such distinct societal entity actually exists within neoliberal political theory. So there it is: the first of many equivocations propagated by Heritage, engraved right there at the entrance to the think tank. What are we to make of this habit of playing fast and loose with the truth?
The recent fascination with the role of the Koch brothers in modern American politics has uncovered evidence revealing the great lengths that the think tanks, astroturfed single-issue organizations, corporate shell entities and general political consultancies go to obscure the shared agendas, sources of funding, personnel and organizational structure that comprise their not-solittle neoliberal empire of political activity. One such attempt to graph the tangled network of organizations for a subset of the Koch empire by the Washington Post is reproduced below as were never any qualms expressed about their simultaneous drive to take over the Republican Party, and then the US government, in pursuit of imposition of their agenda of a strong state and an even stronger set of state-instituted novel markets. 22 The neoliberals often had to disguise their true allegiances from the masses: as Friedman once claimed, "the two groups that threaten the free market the most are businessmen and intellectuals" (Burgin, 2012, p.194 ). Yet Friedman promoted the destruction of state education and the privatization of universities to put the intellectuals out of business; he never attacked the businessmen to any equivalent degree. Indeed, he openly preached the doctrine that corporations had no responsibilities to society other than to maximize their profits; if corporations were persons, they were of the purest strain of self- 23 Friedman thought the masses should be cajoled to entertain some neoliberal precepts through popular outlets;
George Stigler thought neoliberals should just stick to their natural constituency, the rich who funded their ideas. Some of these doctrines later were reconciled with one another; but most of them were not. Members of the NTC were aware of these tensions; but they also were familiar with a number of political thinkers who argued such double standards were necessary, and even politically warranted.
In other work I have insisted upon the importance for Hayek and others of the Nazi political theorist Carl Schmitt and his theory of the political as based upon the critical exception to legal structures in the eventuality of emergency. The law served certain purposes, but in the final analysis, order only came from those willing to ignore the law in times of crisis. I think there is no better way to understand the behavior of the Federal Reserve in the recent crisis than through the Schmittian lens. Others, such as Will Davies, have noted the importance of the Schmittian exception in the bailouts in the European Union. 24 So there is more than one way to begin to understand the thought collective's commitment to the strong state. But there is yet another thinker, once located at Chicago, who has been sadly overlooked.
I am referring here to the work of the political theorist Leo Strauss. There has been a flood of academic literature attempting to debate whether or not Strauss was a major influence on the neoconservative movement in the United States; but that is not my current concern.
Rather, I would like to suggest that Leo Strauss had a detectable profound influence on the Neoliberal movement, mainly through getting them to confront more directly their internal endemic problem of needing to espouse a set of double truths.
I am not aware of any historian who has explored in depth the shared presuppositions of Strauss and someone like Hayek; but they do seem substantial, at first glance. As Edward Banfield wrote, "It was evident to Strauss that men have not become wiser than they were in the 23 (Skousen, 2005) . 24 (Davies, 2014 The most notorious doctrine of Strauss, and the one clearly relevant to our concern with neoliberal doublespeak, is his claims about the place of esotericism in the theory of politics. argued that when reading these pre-modern thinkers, it is necessary to read between the lines. He argued those writers were concerned with the conflict between the quest for truth and the strictures of society; they may seem to argue for one thing sanctioned by law and culture, but in fact expect a second more attuned set of readers to take away a different message, sometimes the opposite of what appears to be the thesis. Thus the majority will take away one message, while simultaneously a specially prepared philosophical elite may be able to glean a different, esoteric message, a secret teaching. In the case of Maimonides, it was actual persecution of Jews which summoned forth the need for resort to a double meaning in textual expression; but he later extended the demands of esoteric knowledge to all those who dealt with the philosophy of law.
In effect, the exterior literal meaning of the law serves to sustain a political community which requires fealty to particular forms of behavior and belief, whereas a different esoteric meaning of the law is a matter of philosophical speculation only for those capable to handle such speculation responsibly.
25 (Banfield, 1991, p.496) .
It is important to acknowledge that Strauss only wrote about esoterism with regard to mostly pre-modern writers; there was no explicit attempt on his part to extend the doctrine to modern political entities. Although there is no direct evidence the Straussian approach to esoteric knowledge dictated in detail the terms of the NTC's eventual espousal of a number of double truths, the ubiquitous political necessity of saying one thing and doing another was especially salient when it came to neoliberal doctrine. The neoliberals believed that the market always knew better than any human being; but humans would never voluntarily capitulate to that truth. People would resist utter abjection to the demands of the market; they would never completely dissolve into undifferentiated 'human capital'; they would flinch at the idea that the political franchise needed 26 (Eberstein, 2003, p.253) . 27 Hayek, letter to Strauss, undated, Leo Strauss Papers, Regenstein Library, Box 2 Folder 1. "I had hoped that your note saying that you were unable to come to the Seminar refered [sic] only to the first meeting, but I am now beginning to fear it may have meant to cover the whole quarter. I should be exceedingly sorry if that is the case, but I am not yet prepared to give up hope altogether that I may not at least be able to persuade you not only to come to the one meeting where we should need your help most but even to open the discussion with a brief statement of the problem, which you are better qualified to do than anybody I know. It is the meeting of February 7 on 'Natural Justice and Positive Law and the Concepts of Law and Justice'." to be restricted rather than broadened; they would be revolted that the condition of being 'free to choose' only meant forgetting any political rights and giving up all pretense of being able to take charge of their own course through life. Neoliberal ideals would always be a hard sell; how much easier to avoid all that with simplistic stories that fogged the mind of the masses: government is always bad; everything you need to know is already in Adam Smith; you can be anything you want to be; there is no such thing as class or the dead hand of history; everything can be made better if you just express yourself on some social media platform; there is nothing wrong with you that a little shopping won't fix.
In their heart of hearts, philosophically sophisticated neoliberals know that none of this is strictly true; and they even can concede this once in a while within internal discussions of neoliberal doctrine. They can't go around saying in public that, "We must seize power and use all the tools of government to get the government to impose the ideal market on a recalcitrant populace." Here they learned a lesson from the hard Marxist Left in the 20 th century, who repeatedly insisted that they might temporarily have to bring about turbo-charged capitalism with enhanced exploitation as a necessary prelude to an eventual true socialism. Most political programs at some juncture must promise both A and not-A simultaneously in order to exert sovereignty. What is noteworthy about the neoliberals is that they forged a unified doctrine and institutional structure to do just that: they can reassure themselves that no human being is capable of second-guessing the Truth of the Market, and therefore spreading ignorance about their own true motives is not duplicity, but rather, foaming the runway for the bearers of real civilization to land and take over. There is no better modern exemplar of the core of the Straussian political doctrine of the noble lie.
The net result of the reconciliation of theory and practice has been a political movement that dares not speak its own name.
